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[A]n American judge can pronounce a decision only when litiga-
tion has arisen, he is conversant with special cases, and he can-
not act until the cause has been duly brought before the court.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Administrative law—whether instantiated in judicial decision-
making, law practice, or academic work on administrative law—is 
rooted in reading cases. The role of cases in judicial decisionmaking, 
and in lawyering that depends in no small part upon predicting judi-
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor, Department of Economics, University of California at Irvine; Professor, 
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the support of the Olin Foundation and the generosity and hospitality of the USC Law 
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 1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at ch. VI, 99-100 (Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835). 
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cial decisionmaking, is so obvious as to require no documentation. 
The case method, rooted in analogical reasoning, suffuses the area.2 
 Cases fill different roles in different types of scholarship. In his-
torical review,3 the cases represent part of the record to which we 
turn to find out “what happened.” In evaluations of courts’ statutory 
interpretations, 4 we read the cases to understand a court’s reading of 
the statute in question. When we directly critique the structure of 
judicial review of agency action,5 we read the cases and the corre-
sponding regulatory actions to deduce the relationship between judi-
cial review and administrative behavior. When we puzzle through 
the implications of emphasizing presidential authority for New Deal 
regulation,6 we seek to understand how cases approving of this em-
                                                                                                                  
 2. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON,  AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 
25-26 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 
(1993). 
 3. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Re-
form: A Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 43-48 (1996) (arguing that recent APA 
reform proposals can be harmonized with the larger, historical purposes of the APA); 
Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refine-
ments, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299, 324-27 (1983); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law , 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1760-90 (1975). See generally Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) 
(analyzing how the modern administrative state is unconstitutional); Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law 
Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997) (analyzing intellectual history); Richard B. 
Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (1990) (analyzing the administra-
tion of the administrative state).  
 4. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget 
Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999) (critiquing the Su-
preme Court’s evaluation of the Line Item Veto Act); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and 
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023 (1998) (highlighting the im-
portance of background principles of administrative law in construing administrative law 
statutes); Katherine L. Vaughns, A Tale of Two Opinions: The Meaning of Statutes and the 
Nature of Judicial Decision-Making in the Administrative Context, 1995 BYU L. REV. 139 
(examining the D.C. Circuit’s review of immigration law interpretations by the INS). 
 5. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Contro-
versies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1988) (explaining that the Constitution circumscribes 
powers to government branches by limiting the capabilities of the other branches); Thomas 
O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 
1385 (1992) (explaining that agencies have attempted to ensure that rules are capable of 
withstanding judicial scrutiny); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial 
Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of 
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 8 (1991) (analyzing how judicial review has caused policy 
paralysis); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal 
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 766 
(criticizing Pierce, supra); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent 
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
483, 514 (1997) (defending the hard look doctrine).  
 6. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidential-
ism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 227 (1998); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power 
in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or 
Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 841-44 (1996); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Man-
agement, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administra-
tive State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1182 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to 
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phasis change the behavior of the agencies and other branches of 
government. Indeed, the emphasis on reading cases has led to the 
urge to prescribe canons of statutory construction for courts to use.7 
 Modern “high brow” work in administrative law—work that often 
merges with constitutional law—tends to use political, constitutional, 
and social theory as major premises in structuring arguments. The-
ory may play several different roles, but it cannot supplant reading 
the cases. Theory’s biggest task is to reconcile administrative agen-
cies with democratic constitutional theory.8 Theory may give us, in 
some way, the nature of good doctrine in this area9—an idea of how 
things ought to be. At least theory tells us which sets of doctrines are 
acceptable.10 Theory may also try to reconcile administrative law 
with justifications for regulation.11 At any rate, we then read the 
                                                                                                                  
Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (1994); Peter L. 
Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 965, 967-68 (1997). 
 7. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 111-12 (1990). For a trenchant critique, see Richard B. Stewart, Regu-
latory Jurisprudence: Canons Redux?, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 807 (1991) (book review). 
 8. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Le-
gitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997) (noting that consti-
tutional law provides rules for the government); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Jus-
tification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992) (using civic republican 
theory to provide a justification for the modern administrative state). For an extremely 
cranky view of the role of theory in legal academic work, see Harry T. Edwards, The Grow-
ing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 
(1992) (“Our law reviews are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles. Too many law 
professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques their interest, 
whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they have the scholarly 
skills to master it.”). Judge Edwards also makes the good point that legal doctrine, rooted 
partly in cases, must be part of good legal work, applying theory to law. See id. at 37. 
 9. See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political 
Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 561 (describing the realm of legal theory as “the source of 
most prescriptions for the reform of legal doctrines and institutions”); Jody Freeman, Col-
laborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (suggest-
ing that, among other things, judicial review needs to be less intrusive to allow administra-
tion to achieve “collaborative governance”).  
 10. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Be-
yond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 760 (1997) (arguing that 
we must get beyond Bickel’s “Least Dangerous Branch” paradigm); Cynthia R. Farina, The 
Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
987, 987 (1997) (finding more difficulties in the legitimization of administrative action); 
Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 800 (1999) (finding 
relative to Farina, see supra, little conflict between democratic theory and delegation of 
power to administrative agencies).  
 11. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 
(1997) (arguing for a middle ground between public choice theory’s proponents and detrac-
tors); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM . L. REV. 1 (1998). For an insightful critique of Mashaw’s simultaneous overt dis-
trust and sophisticated use of social choice theory, see Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice 
and the Legal Academy , 86 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1998) (book review). See also Cynthia R. Fa-
rina, Getting From Here to There, 1991 DUKE L.J. 689, 694-95 (attempting to chart a re-
search agenda for administrative law once process and substance have been irrevocably 
joined); Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary 
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cases to see if the law conforms to the theoretical ideal, and if not, 
whether the deviations are large.  
 A new branch of administrative law scholarship attempts to apply 
“Positive Political Theory” (PPT) to administrative law and agen-
cies. 12 Under the framework of PPT, the cases assume several roles. 
In many articles, particular cases provide examples that undergird 
the analysis. 13 In others, cases are used as intentional manipulations 
by the justices to get outcomes they want.14  
 For virtually all of these purposes, we read administrative law 
cases in the Supreme Court. For the most part, we assume that the 
cases we see are the cases that we “should” see.15 From that starting 
point, lower court judges attempt to deduce the law to be applied, 
lawyers attempt to predict the behavior of judges (of both the lower 
courts and the Supreme Court), and academics do whatever we do. 
 What if our assumption that we see the cases that we “should” see 
is wrong? Perhaps the set of cases we get to see is filtered before we 
get to see them. What if the set of cases that the Supreme Court gets 
to decide is biased by the actions of someone not on the Court? It 
                                                                                                                  
Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1749 (1998) (book review) (pointing out 
Mashaw’s tendency to criticize and utilize public choice theory without a satisfying over-
arching theory of how to do so).  
 12. See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Politi-
cal Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757 (1996) (analyzing how 
a legislative record contains signals about a statute’s meaning); Richard L. Revesz, Reha-
bilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (showing that race-to-the-bottom 
arguments have no support in present models of interjurisdictional competition, and if 
they had support over environmental standards, then federal regulation would not play an 
integral role); Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An 
Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 85 (1997) (applying “game theoretic” analysis to refine Mashaw and Harfst’s proposal 
to delay judicial review of rulemaking). 
 13. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 passim (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Fere-
john, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 523-28 (1992); McNollgast, Politics 
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1631, 1671-73 (1996).  
 14. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes—Strategic Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992) (arguing that courts interpret statutes to favor one 
legislature over another). Of course, there are parts of academic administrative law where 
reading cases does not seem to loom large. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Struc-
tures of Decision-Making in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998) 
(arguing the need to reconsider and possibly revamp the federal budget process); Jonathan 
R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1998, at 109 (citing no cases); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Rein-
venting the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995) (reviewing executive orders 
12,291 and 12,498). These areas of academic administrative law, while crucial to the full 
study of our subject, will not be the topic of our inquiry. 
 15. Of course there are table decisions, but we assume that the Court has decided 
that they are not important enough to merit our attention. 
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would affect the accuracy and legitimacy of all the reasons for which 
we read cases. 
 In this Article, we present both theory and evidence that the stra-
tegic behavior of government litigators routinely alters the set of 
cases from which the Supreme Court gets to choose. This advantage 
works in favor of the government—the Supreme Court gets to decide 
cases in which the government has a large chance of victory. As a 
consequence, our administrative common law in the Supreme Court 
is tilted toward the government. 
 The notion that a petitioner’s actions might constrain the Su-
preme Court’s agenda may appear unlikely given low certiorari suc-
cess rates. Fewer than one hundred cases are now granted certiorari 
per year, out of over three thousand petitions, suggesting that the 
Supreme Court has plenty of choices.16 As opposed to a lack of mate-
rial constraining the Court, Richard Posner writes that a surfeit of 
cases (and inadequate judicial resources) reduces the power and ef-
fectiveness of the judicial branch.17 However, the federal government 
is typically successful, receiving certiorari for 60% or more of its peti-
tions year in and year out.18 This statistic, vastly at odds with the 
success rate in the population of certiorari petitions, indicates that 
the Solicitor General’s Office is highly selective in choosing which 
cases to appeal to the Supreme Court. Indeed, to the extent that the 
federal government’s success rate in obtaining Supreme Court review 
has been investigated, it has been ascribed to presenting the Su-
preme Court with only the most important cases. 19 The Solicitor 
General is usually credited with helping out the Supreme Court by 
prescreening possibilities and petitioning only the type of cases likely 
to be granted certiorari. 20  
 Our analysis is not at odds with this conclusion, but it goes fur-
ther by suggesting that, far more than the typical appellant in cases 
                                                                                                                  
 16. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM,  ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 89 
tbl.A1, http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/a01sep98.pdf. 
 17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM  129 (1985); 
see also McNollgast, supra note 13, at 1638 (asserting that engineering a judicial resource 
crunch (either fewer judges or more cases) is a deliberate strategy used by the other 
branches of government when convenient and feasible). 
 18. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 25 
(1992). 
 19. A substantial body of literature investigates how the Supreme Court sets its 
agenda by choosing cases to review. As far as we are aware, these studies all assume that 
the Court is not constrained in its choices by its petitioners. Classic studies include 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (Glendon Schubert et al. eds., 1963); Sydney S. Ulmer, The 
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 901, 901-11 (1979); and, using a very different methodology, H.W. PERRY, JR., 
DECIDING TO DECIDE  216-270 (1991). 
 20. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in 
the Supreme Court, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 809, 815-17 (1990). 
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with federal respondents, 21 the Solicitor General declines to petition 
for certiorari in some cases which the Supreme Court would also like 
to hear; that is, the screening process applied by the government 
might be so extremely selective as to change the Supreme Court’s 
menu of cases. Our argument rests on considerations that are stan-
dard in rational choice studies of legal appeals. As we will show, 
there are major asymmetries between the costs and benefits of cases 
appealed by private litigants and the costs and benefits of cases ap-
pealed by government litigants. These asymmetries arise from the 
institutional structure of the federal judiciary and from administra-
tive judicial review. As a result, the incentives to pursue Supreme 
Court review differ enormously between the U.S. government and 
other parties.  
 None of our analysis should be understood as making any claims 
about the big normative question in the area: Is the government-
petitioner advantage22 good or bad? The ability of the U.S. govern-
ment to gain an advantage at the Supreme Court through litigation 
strategy might be a good thing, a bad thing, or morally neutral. An-
swering the big question would require confronting questions about 
whether the decisions of the Solicitor General have moral force inde-
pendent from decisions of the rest of the executive branch; whether 
the executive branch, as a unitary whole, has a constitutional role in 
interpreting statutes and the constitution, perhaps through manipu-
lating litigation; whether the strategic behavior of the Supreme 
Court justifies strategic behavior by the executive branch; whether 
strategic litigation behavior by the executive branch is morally ac-
ceptable; and so on. Professors Gifford and Rossi, in their comments 
on our Article,23 do an admirable job of starting the rather complex 
conversation needed to parse these moral problems. We take no posi-
tion on the moral and normative questions, resting with a purely de-
scriptive task—describing a feature of modern administrative law 
adjudication. 
 In Part II of this Article, we present our theory of why a govern-
ment advantage should exist. In Part III, we discuss empirical evi-
                                                                                                                  
 21. The certiorari success rate for petitions with federal respondents average is less 
than 4% per year, which is consistent with the claim that the government is more careful 
with its appeals than are other parties. See SALOKAR, supra note 18. This statistic is fur-
ther consistent with a selection effect in that it establishes that not all (or most) cases in-
volving the federal government are worthy of Supreme Court review. 
 22. The government-petitioner advantage refers to the U.S. government’s greater 
chance of victory at the Supreme Court level. 
 23. See Daniel J. Gifford, Why Does a Conservative Court Rule in Favor of a Liberal 
Government? The Spitzer-Cohen Analysis and the Constitutional Scheme, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 427 (2000); Jim Rossi, Does the Solicitor General Advantage Thwart the Rule of Law 
in the Administrative State?, 28 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 459 (2000).  
2000]  GOVERNMENT LITIGANT ADVANTAGE 397 
 
dence that supports the existence of a government advantage. In 
Part IV, we discuss implications for administrative law. 
II.   GOVERNMENT ADVANTAGE 
 An apparent government advantage could exist for several rea-
sons. First, the government may diverge from private litigants in its 
petitioning behavior. Another possibility is that the Supreme Court 
is in general more progovernment than are circuit courts. Third, the 
government may, in general, do a better job at preparing and arguing 
its case before the Supreme Court than do other litigants. Each of 
these possibilities is considered below.  
A.   Suit and Settlement in Public Law 
 We follow the standard law and economics analytic framework 
and assume that a potential appellant appeals only on the expecta-
tion of gain, and an appellant considers, in addition to the benefits of 
winning or costs of losing, the likelihood of success on appeal, the 
costs of further litigation, and the settlement opportunities. Our 
analysis focuses on two distinctions between the way that the federal 
government and other litigants evaluate these parameters: the first 
relates to the enhanced ability of the federal government to internal-
ize externalities of Supreme Court decisions, and the second relates 
to differential authority of lower court decisions over the federal gov-
ernment vis-à-vis private litigants. 
1.   The Scale and Scope of Supreme Court Decisions 
 Our analysis builds on the function that the Supreme Court plays 
in the judicial hierarchy. As H.W. Perry documents in his extensive 
study of certiorari, the Supreme Court does not believe its role is to 
correct errors of lower courts or even to ensure justice, but rather, as 
Justice Vinson wrote, “to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal ques-
tions that have arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of 
wide import under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts.”24 
Implications of this characterization of Supreme Court decisions are 
that the decisions typically have greater scope and scale than the ap-
pellate decision under review and that they are likely to affect agen-
cies, companies, or individuals not party to the original suit. Indeed, 
externalities of scope or scale might be considered a prerequisite for 
Supreme Court review.  
                                                                                                                  
 24. PERRY, supra note 19, at 36 (quoting Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Remarks Be-
fore the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949)). 
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 The federal government, to a much greater extent than other liti-
gants, can take account of these externalities when it decides 
whether or not to pursue litigation. The federal government’s range 
of activities, like the reach of Supreme Court decisions, is national in 
scale. If, for example, a litigant with local operations appealed a cir-
cuit court decision and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, 
the litigant would have merely lost litigation costs relative to his po-
sition prior to the appeal; the “loss” in court (net of litigation costs) 
would be the same whether the Supreme Court heard (and affirmed) 
the case or not. The executive branch, similarly situated, might have 
to modify operations not only within the original circuit but also in 
other parts of the country. 
 This discrepancy continues to hold even when the nongovernmen-
tal litigant is national, as is frequently the case in Supreme Court 
litigation, or when the case originates from the exclusive jurisdiction 
caseload of either the Federal Circuit Court or the executive branch 
agencies.25 The Chevron decision, which came to the D.C. Court of 
Appeals under its exclusive jurisdiction, illustrates the point. 26 The 
Chevron decision established a standard of greater judicial deference 
to the executive branch that applied across the entire range of ad-
ministrative actions, as well as upholding the EPA regulation that 
defines a “source” for purposes of pollution abatement standards. 27 
 Two prominent, recent cases illustrate the differential incentives 
of federal and other parties similarly situated as potential petition-
ers. 28 In both of these cases, the federal government argued against 
certiorari, although its denial would automatically uphold appellate 
                                                                                                                  
 25. The circuit courts that have exclusive jurisdiction receive national precedential 
authority for their decisions. See Richard Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administra-
tive Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1990). The national precedential 
authority includes appeals of patent cases by the Federal Circuit Court and appeals of 
cases related to aspects of the clean air and broadcasting regulation by the D.C. Circuit 
Court. See id. at 1123-25. The Federal Circuit Court also has exclusive jurisdiction over 
cases involving claims against the federal government; however, these cases often involve 
issues related to tax cases heard by other circuit courts, limiting the national precedential 
value of the cases. See id. at 1112. Exclusive jurisdiction cases are very rarely granted cer-
tiorari and heard by the Supreme Court, perhaps because of the diminished possibility for 
intercircuit conflicts. See id. at 1158-61. For a comprehensive discussion of exclusive juris-
diction, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts 
and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Revesz, supra. 
 26. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844-45 (1984). 
 27. See id. Very extensive literature analyzes the nature and implications of this deci-
sion. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: 
A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 433 (1996). 
 28. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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court decisions against the government.29 In the fall of 1997, the Pis-
cataway, New Jersey, Board of Education unexpectedly settled with 
a white high school teacher, Ms. Taxman, who had successfully sued 
the school board by claiming that her layoff was based on illegal ra-
cial discrimination.30 Both a federal district court31 and the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals (where the Board of Education was joined 
by the EEOC in arguing for the legality of the district’s retention 
policies) 32 had agreed with Ms. Taxman’s claim—the latter awarding 
her back wages and punitive damages of over $400,000.33 
 In 1997, the Piscataway Board of Education petitioned for Su-
preme Court review.34 The Clinton Administration, concerned that a 
Supreme Court decision would have a negative impact on efforts 
elsewhere in the country to promote diversity through policies like 
those of the Piscataway Board of Education, argued unsuccessfully 
that the Supreme Court should decline to review the case.35 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 36 In November 1997, the Black Lead-
ership Forum, hoping to avoid the anticipated national precedent, of-
fered to pay 70% of the settlement if the Piscataway Board of Educa-
tion would drop the case, which it did.37 Newspaper articles called the 
move a “tactical retreat”; affirmative action opponents claimed that 
the rights groups “ducked a fight.”38 Of course, sooner or later such a 
case might make it to the Supreme Court. The Black Leadership Fo-
rum was hoping for later.39 
 An analogous issue arose during 1997 when the National Re-
search Council (NRC) (the operating arm of the National Academy of 
Sciences) lost a series of court appeals to the Animal Legal Defense 
Fund, which argued that its members had been illegally barred from 
NRC meetings and that the NRC was subject to the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act40 (FACA).41 The NRC appealed the case from the D.C. 
                                                                                                                  
 29. See Linda Greenhouse, Settlement Ends High Court Case of Preferences, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1; Andrew Lawler, Government Bows Out of Academy Case, 
SCIENCE , Oct. 3, 1997, at 28. 
 30. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Barry Bearak, Rights Groups Ducked a 
Fight, Opponents Say , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1. 
 31. See United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836, 851 (D.N.J. 1993).  
 32. See 91 F.3d at 1565-66. 
 33. See id.; see also 832 F. Supp. at 851; Greenhouse, supra note 29. 
 34. See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997) (granting 
certiorari). 
 35. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Bearak, supra note 30. 
 36. See Piscataway , 521 U.S. at 1117. 
 37. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Bearak, supra note 30. 
 38. Bearak, supra note 30. 
 39. See Greenhouse, supra note 29. 
 40. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1998) (requiring federal “advisory committees” to maintain 
public records and have public meetings). 
 41. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 426 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
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Circuit to the Supreme Court and asked the Justice Department to 
file a petition supporting the appeal and the Academy.42 The Justice 
Department declined to file a supporting petition because of concern 
that a Supreme Court review would jeopardize previous rulings that 
exempted some committees from FACA, and would perhaps open up 
other committees that had escaped FACA notice.43 At the time, a Jus-
tice Department “source” told Science magazine that “there was a lot 
of pressure from the agencies [to join the case], but if we got a bad 
result from the court, the ramifications weren’t limited to the acad-
emy.”44 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, letting the lower court 
decision stand.45 In a further twist, Congress then passed, and the 
President signed, a bill that exempted the NRC from the Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act. 46 
 While these cases illustrate the difference in costs of losing, they 
may perhaps appear of limited practical importance. In the Piscata-
way case, the local party (the Board of Education), because of the in-
tervention of the Black Leadership Forum, pursued the strategy that 
would have been taken by a national interest. 47 The Coase Theorem 
teaches us that externalities are relevant to litigation only in the 
presence of transaction costs. 48 Externalities create asymmetric costs 
and benefits only if the two sides to the litigation are also asymmet-
rically able to internalize the externalities. 49 That is, the effort re-
quired to take account of the externalities must be more costly for 
one of the litigants than the other.50 It seems plausible to assert that 
the government would have lower transaction costs and be successful 
more often in internalizing external costs (or benefits) of appeals. 
The Black Leadership Forum intervention is unusual. National in-
terests like the National Resource Defense Council, which pursued 
the Chevron case, are frequently involved in Supreme Court cases, 
but these organizations have narrower constituencies than the fed-
eral government. The final Part of this Article considers in more de-
tail the extent of the difference in the scope of interests between the 
                                                                                                                  
 42. See Lawler, supra note 29, at 28. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See National Academy of Sciences v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 522 U.S. 
949 (1997). 
 46. See Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-153, 
111 Stat. 2689 (1997) (exempting the NRC from FACA but with other kinds of sunshine re-
strictions). Examining the strategies to appeal and accept appeals of all the actors is well 
beyond this Article. It is interesting, however, to speculate about this case and whether the 
Supreme Court was cognizant of the likelihood of statutory reversal at the hands of Con-
gress by its denial of certiorari. On the general issue of statutory overrides, see generally 
Eskridge, supra note 13. 
 47. See Greenhouse, supra note 29; see also Bearak, supra note 30. 
 48. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
 49. See id. at 44. 
 50. See id.  
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two parties in typical cases. Another difference, critical to our em-
pirical formulation, however, is institutional. In contrast to other 
parties, the federal government not only starts with the advantage 
that it is, in its entirety, national in scale and broad in scope, but the 
government, through the activities of the Department of Justice and 
the Office of the Solicitor General, has institutionalized a mechanism 
to manage the appellate caseload that accounts for interjurisdictional 
externalities. 
 The Department of Justice handles most government litigation.51 
The specific relationship between the Justice Department lawyers 
and the lawyers who work in the administrative agencies is impor-
tant to both the argument and the empirical analysis in the following 
Part. 52 Litigation in federal district courts may be conducted by ei-
ther Department of Justice (DOJ) or agency lawyers.53 In either 
event, the decision to litigate is effectively at the discretion of the 
agency (and, of course, its opposing party).54 Appeals follow a differ-
ent pattern. DOJ lawyers are generally involved in all appeals before 
circuit courts of appeal. 55 Any appeal by the government requires the 
approval of the Office of the Solicitor General, which approves only a 
modest fraction (around one quarter, according to Horowitz) of ap-
peal requests by agencies. 56 Alternatively, DOJ lawyers routinely ad-
vise agency lawyers or undertake a defense themselves when an 
agency is the defendant in a case before an appellate court; this liti-
gation requires no formal review by the Solicitor General. 57 Finally, 
                                                                                                                  
 51. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY:  GOVERNING LAWYERS, AGENCY 
PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1 (1977).  
 52. Some exceptions to the characterization in the text exist, most often when the 
Justice Department asserts litigating authority and an agency disagrees. See, e.g., Mail 
Order Ass’n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (deny-
ing DOJ’s challenge to U.S. Postal Service’s attempt to represent itself in appeal of a Postal 
Rate Commission order), discussed in Patricia Wald, “For the United States”: Government 
Lawyers in Court, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 107, 127 & n.83; Federal Elec-
tion Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (restricting the ability of 
the Federal Election Commission to seek certiorari without the approval of the Solicitor 
General), discussed in Alane Tempchin, Note & Comment, Fall From Grace: Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund and the Demise of the FEC’s Independent 
Litigating Authority, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 385, 403-08 (1996). 
 53. See HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 39-44. 
 54. See id. at 6. 
 55. See id. at 44-45. 
 56. See id. at 48.  
 57. See id. at 63. Horowitz offers several arguments for the distinction: the need to 
maintain reasonable relations with district court judges who have ruled in favor of the 
government and might be put off if the government abandoned the case; support for the 
government lawyers who successfully tried the case; and avoidance of conflict with an 
agency, which, fresh from a victory in a district court, might be unpersuaded by an argu-
ment from the DOJ that the case lacks merit. See id. The same features are credited with 
the government’s relative enthusiasm for pursuing Supreme Court cases as defendant 
rather than plaintiff, although in that forum the Solicitor General is virtually always in-
volved. See Wald, supra note 52, at 127. 
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the Solicitor General files all petitions for certiorari and litigates es-
sentially all government cases before the Supreme Court.58 
 The centralized litigating authority of the DOJ responds to a need 
perceived by Congress (and others) for consistency in the federal po-
sition in litigation.59 The issue is revisited periodically due to conflict 
between agencies and the DOJ and due to dissatisfaction outside the 
executive branch with the DOJ’s handling of cases. The usual conclu-
sion is that the system, if flawed, is necessary. The need for consis-
tency and the centralization response relate directly to our discussion 
of externalities. While the federal government only rarely finds itself 
in direct litigation against itself,60 the immediate litigation interests 
of different agencies frequently are at odds with the positions of 
other agencies; other parts of the executive; or the longer-run goals, 
interests, or reputation of the government as litigator. Such discrep-
ancies are usually at the root of decisions by the DOJ to forego ap-
peals. 61 By foregoing appeals, the DOJ internalizes litigation exter-
nalities for the executive branch of government.  
2.   Federal Administrative Agencies and the Lower Federal Courts 
 The preceding discussion suggests that the government (for ex-
ample, the executive branch of the government) may routinely calcu-
late the costs and benefits of a Supreme Court defeat or victory dif-
ferently from other litigants. By internalizing broader impacts of a 
decision, both the costs and benefits may be larger for the federal 
government than for other litigants. This does not by itself imply 
that success rates would be different if both costs and benefits in-
crease proportionately and then that no change in appellate strategy 
would result. However, other features of the system contribute to 
such a conclusion. 
 One feature that contributes to this conclusion is that the cost to 
the federal government of staying with a loss at a district court, or 
even circuit court, can be modest. 62 Indeed, a significant part of the 
external benefits from a victory at the Supreme Court fade when the 
differential treatment of the executive branch by the lower courts is 
taken into account. When the government loses a case in a lower 
court, the government is obligated to alter its behavior only toward 
the particular plaintiff in the suit; the government will not have to 
change practices relative to similarly situated individuals in other 
                                                                                                                  
 58. See HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 47.  
 59. See id. at 6. 
 60. But see United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 377 U.S. 426 (1949); Wald, 
supra note 52, at 127. 
 61. See generally HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at chs. 2, 7. 
 62. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 699-702 (1989). 
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circuits, to analogous activities in other agencies, or even to identi-
cally situated individuals in the same circuit. 63 
 Administrative nonacquiescence (refusing to generally change 
governmental behavior because of a loss in a lower court) has been 
the subject of a substantial body of legal literature.64 The logic of in-
tercircuit nonacquiescence is straightforward. The Supreme Court, 
among others, finds value in the lack of intercircuit stare decisis. 65 
Divergent opinions in the circuit courts signal difficulties in inter-
preting laws and changing social values or norms, and these opinions 
allow “percolation” of issues, providing valuable signals and informa-
tion to the Supreme Court about which issues it should review.66 
Moreover, when a circuit court invalidates some administrative prac-
tice, the law is presumed to be in a state of flux, hence the availabil-
ity of further review.67 If administrative agencies changed national 
regulations in response to a single circuit decision, they would curtail 
the ability of other courts to issue divergent opinions. 68 Furthermore, 
on occasions when the circuits disagree, an agency would be in an 
impossible situation, needing to institute conflicting regulations na-
tionwide.69 
 Once the principle of intercircuit nonacquiescence is accepted, the 
far more controversial intracircuit form is close at hand. One set of 
justifications arises from the goal of the federal administrative agen-
cies: to institute a national, standard regulatory regime.70 In addition 
to the obvious managerial problems associated with administering 
conflicting regulations in different parts of the country, some form of 
standardization was deemed desirable to justify federal, as opposed 
to state, regulation in the first place.71 For example, different stan-
dards of fair labor practices in different parts of the country might 
promote an unfair basis for competition among businesses. 72 If an 
                                                                                                                  
 63. See id. at 681 & n.1. 
 64. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 25. 
 65. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 736-37. 
 66. A particularly insightful discussion of this issue and its relationship to the strate-
gies open to the Supreme Court to manage the judicial hierarchy is contained in Peter L. 
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM . L. REV. 1093, 1095-96 
(1987). 
 67. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 737-38. 
 68. See id. at 738. 
 69. Some proponents of nonacquiescence go further, arguing that while agencies must 
defer to Supreme Court rulings, no such constitutional provision exists with respect to the 
circuit courts. Both the circuit courts and the agencies are created by Congress; delegation 
from Congress to the agencies means they need not defer to the circuit courts. See id. at 
730. 
 70. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 695 & n.66, 720 & n.212. 
 71. See id. at 695 & n.66, 714 & n.186. 
 72. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1998) (protecting the 
health, efficiency, and well-being of workers in working conditions). 
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agency follows a circuit court’s directives by modifying regulations 
within a circuit, but leaves them unchanged in other circuits, the 
agency creates nonstandard regulatory regimes. 
 A second set of justifications arises from the structure of judicial 
review for administrative law. In some cases, the identity of a re-
viewing court is not known beforehand.73 Some statutes (for example, 
the National Labor Relations Act74) allow a plaintiff to appeal a case 
to courts in different circuits: the plaintiff’s own circuit, the circuit of 
his place of business, or the circuit of the corporate headquarters of 
his employer.75 Similarly, patent infringement suits may be initially 
taken to a variety of districts with connections to the plaintiff, defen-
dant, and both of their headquarters or research divisions. 76 While 
the judiciary has tried to cut back on forum shopping, it is still the 
case that some administrative actions can be appealed to a variety of 
different circuit courts. 77 Agencies have argued that it is not possible 
to determine ex ante which circuit’s decisions should be controlling.78 
Hence, the arguments that justify intercircuit nonacquiescence, 
when combined with the plaintiff’s ability to choose the circuit, may 
also justify intracircuit nonacquiesence. 
 Not surprisingly, the various federal courts find the practice of 
nonacquiescence deeply aggravating, but the practice persists and 
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.79 Patricia Wald, former Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in 
an analysis of government lawyers in courts, conceded that:  
[t]he conduct of government litigation in the courts of the United 
States is sufficiently different from the conduct of private civil liti-
gation in those courts so that what might otherwise be economy in-
terests underlying a broad application of collateral estoppel are 
outweighed by the constraints which particularly affect the Gov-
ernment. In short, collateral estoppel may not be applied against 
the government if the parties are not the same.80 
 Nonacquiesence can help alter the value of appeals to the federal 
government, when compared to the costs and benefits of appeals to 
private parties. If the costs of a Supreme Court loss are higher for 
the government than they are for other litigants, and if the costs of 
staying with a lower court loss are lower for the government than 
they are for other litigants, then we would expect that, in deciding 
                                                                                                                  
 73. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiesence, Cromwell v. Benson, and Administrative 
Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1818-19 & nn.6-10 (1989).  
 74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1998). 
 75. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1819. 
 76. See id.  
 77. See id.  
 78. See id. 
 79. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1984). 
 80. Wald, supra note 52, at 126 (quoting Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162-63). 
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whether to appeal, the government will require a higher likelihood of 
success than other litigants. If enough cases fall into the category of 
appeals that are unattractive to the federal government (an empiri-
cal issue) then the distortions in law discussed above may follow. 
B.   Progovernment Supreme Court: The Repeat Player 
 It is possible that the Supreme Court is more progovernment than 
the circuit courts. This progovernment tendency might provide an 
additional (and possibly complementary) explanation for the federal 
government’s high success rate before the Supreme Court. Two main 
explanations have been offered for the idea of progovernment ten-
dencies. First, a closer policy relationship may exist between the gov-
ernment and the Supreme Court than between the government and 
lower federal courts, where appointments are not subject to as much 
scrutiny, particularly by the executive branch.81 Historically, U.S. 
Senators and state political parties have had considerable influence 
over the choice of circuit court nominees while the President has re-
tained his nominating prerogative for the Supreme Court.82 
 The second explanation arises from the special relationship be-
tween the Supreme Court and the Office of the Solicitor General. The 
government’s frequent position as litigator and the very frequent 
participation of the Solicitor General in front of the Supreme Court 
have been offered as explanations of the very high success rates that 
the government enjoys in that venue.83 There are multiple interpre-
tations of the observation that repeat play breeds success. One view 
is that it is simply repetition that breeds success by affording the re-
petitive litigant with knowledge about the workings of the courts and 
the nature of winning arguments.84 For example, McGuire claims 
that this is all there is to the winning position of the government and 
that no additional, special status is afforded the Solicitor General by 
the judiciary.85  
                                                                                                                  
 81. See ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY at ch. 4, 85-
124 (1971). 
 82. See id. at 100-01. 
 83. The classic text in this area is SCIGLIANO, supra note 81. More recent, excellent 
discussions are contained in SALOKAR, supra note 18, and PERRY, supra note 19. Kevin T. 
McGuire provides a somewhat iconoclastic view and a comprehensive survey of recent lit-
erature in Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, POL. RES. Q., June 
1998, at 505, 505-06. 
 84. See McGuire, supra note  83, at 505-06. 
 85. See id. McGuire’s analysis is based on a painstaking data collection where he 
characterized the experience of the solicitors in all cases before the Supreme Court during 
two terms and showed that the experience “benefit” accrued equivalently to government or 
nongovernment litigants. He also ran a regression that attempted to measure whether the 
Solicitor General additionally does a good job of selecting cases—what we are arguing here. 
He did not find a “sele ction” effect beyond the “experience” effect. See id. at 522-23.  
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 Another aspect of repeat play is that it increases the value of a 
good reputation.86 Repeat players will consequently attempt to de-
velop a good reputation with hope that judges will know their repu-
tation and be inclined to defer to them.87 Most of the time such play-
ers win because they are good, and some of the time they trade on 
their reputation and win anyway.88  
 Finally, the most dignified version of the repeat-play hypothesis is 
that government is in the courts a great deal and wins frequently be-
cause of its responsibilities to promote the public good.89 In this ver-
sion, government lawyers and judges are to some degree on the same 
team, balancing and checking each other as the Founders planned, 
but still working towards similar goals and visions.90 According to 
Judge Wald, this view makes judges more demanding and critical of 
government lawyers than of other litigants; nevertheless, the gov-
ernment appears well-treated by the courts. 91 
 For our purposes, the key feature of each of these hypotheses is 
that they apply to government litigation regardless of whether the 
government is the appellant or the appellee. If the courts defer to 
litigants due to expertise, reputation, or a shared goal of furthering 
the public good, and if these characteristics appear more often in 
government litigants than in other litigants, then the courts will up-
hold the government position disproportionately more often. We 
would not, however, conclude that the nature of cases nor the result-
ing case interpretations are in any sense unrepresentative of what 
the courts would want. Our challenge then, empirically, is to distin-
guish this possibility—that progovernment tendencies of the Su-
                                                                                                                  
 Our analysis differs from his in two ways. First, he assumes that only cases in which the 
government is the petitioner can benefit from the selection effect, ignoring the fact that se-
lection occurs at the circuit court level. Hence, a fraction of cases in which the government 
is the respondent before the Supreme Court might also have a selection effect. This correc-
tion is critical to our results. The second difference is a more subtle one: How should we in-
terpret collinearity? It is entirely plausible that the more experienced lawyers agree only to 
work on the “best” cases and that they, being experienced, have a good idea of what those 
cases are. This applies to government and nongovernment cases. As a result, the correla-
tion, which clearly exists in McGuire’s data (both the selection bias and the government 
bias obtained without the experience variable, leading to a correlation of these measures) 
might be due to selection rather than (or at least, in addition to) experience.  
 Finally, we note that our results are not entirely at odds with his: if any experienced liti-
gant has an advantage, and the government is more often experienced, then the overall ju-
risprudential bias with which we are concerned continues to hold. By the same token, one 
could argue correctly that sometimes nongovernmental litigants also internalize exte rnal-
ities and when they do, they tend to win cases. Again, the bias holds if the government 
does it much more often than anyone else. 
 86. See id. at 510. 
 87. See id.  
 88. See id.  
 89. See id. at 509. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Wald, supra note 52, at 128. 
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preme Court produce the high rates of success for the government in 
the Supreme Court—from the possibility that more strategic behav-
ior by the government in case selection produces the high rate of gov-
ernment success.  
 There is a critical assumption in the analysis that follows: neither 
a close policy relationship between Supreme Court Justices nor any 
of these repeat-play attributes distinguishes government as the peti-
tioner from government as the respondent. The Solicitor General and 
Supreme Court Justices are there in both cases. 92 In fact, Horowitz 
suggests that appeals and defenses are treated very differently by 
the Solicitor General’s office and by the DOJ more generally.93 What-
ever the motivation for treatment, if the result is a selection of ap-
peals, then the bias we hypothesize is a possibility. Clearly, however, 
simply observing that the government tends to win is an inadequate 
test. To the extent that these other reasons—policy relationship and 
repeat-play relationship—hold, the government will tend to win more 
often. Hence, we must seek evidence of disproportionate success 
when the government is in the position of selecting cases for review, 
over and above the high success it may enjoy due to expertise, culti-
vation of reputation, or policy consonance. 
III.   DOES THE GOVERNMENT CONSTRAIN THE SUPREME COURT? 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 Part II discusses our theory of why the cases presented to the Su-
preme Court differ between government and private litigants. This 
does not suggest, even at a theoretical level, that the litigants’ 
choices change the Supreme Court’s behavior. If the Supreme Court 
were to be given a free choice of all the cases in the courts of appeal 
to review, it might choose a set contained within the group appealed 
by the government and private litigants. If this were to be true, then 
the petitioning behavior of the parties would not affect the Supreme 
Court’s selection of cases to hear and decide. Put differently, if the 
government’s petitioning and settlement strategy constrains the Su-
preme Court’s activities, then the government must forego appealing 
some cases the Supreme Court would like to hear and then affirm.  
 This Part proceeds in two steps. First, we provide an overview of 
our econometric strategy, drawing on the traditional wisdom about 
government litigation in the Supreme Court. Then, we discuss our 
attempt to detect—empirically—a strategic government-petitioner 
advantage94 beyond that suggested by the traditional wisdom. 
                                                                                                                  
 92. See HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 10. 
 93. See id. at 63. 
 94. We will not be able to distinguish between an abnormally high reversal rate for 
government-petitioner cases and an abnormally high affirmance rate for government-
respondent cases. Consequently, in this Part, we will refer to the advantage as a govern-
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A.   Existing Studies and the Null Hypothesis 
 Studies of public litigation at the Supreme Court find that the 
government tends to prevail and that it is more successful as the pe-
titioner than as the respondent. 95 Table 1 below96 contains raw statis-
tics about all full Supreme Court decisions between the 1985 and 
1997 terms which were heard on appeal from a circuit court and in 
which the Solicitor General was either a petitioner or a respondent, 
or in which there was no government involvement.97 The pattern is 
striking: the government wins in over 70% of the cases where it is 
the petitioner, and it wins in just under 60% of the cases where it is 
the respondent. The other party does better as the petitioner than as 
the respondent as well but appears to be at a tremendous disadvan-
tage in both roles, prevailing in only 40% of the cases as the peti-
tioner and under 30% of the cases as the respondent. 
 This pattern appears to be consistent with strategic petitioning 
and settlement by the government. However, it is also consistent 
with a combination of two other hypotheses about the Supreme 
Court’s strategic certiorari behavior that have been discussed in the 
literature. The first hypothesis concentrates on the Supreme Court’s 
managerial responsibilities. 98 The argument, in brief, is as follows. 
The Supreme Court can only review a tiny proportion of the lower 
court caseload. One strategy for allocating its scarce reviewing 
“budget” is to grant certiorari preferentially to cases that appear to 
be outliers—cases that are most at variance with the Supreme 
Court’s preferences. If lower courts dislike being overturned on re-
view (if, for instance, they wish to maximize their own policy influ-
ence by writing opinions that hold on appeal) and if they anticipate 
that a decision substantially at variance with the preferences of the 
Supreme Court is likely to attract the Court’s attention and be re-
viewed, then lower courts will attempt to avoid outlier decisions. The 
Supreme Court can, in theory, greatly expand its authority by selec-
tively reviewing outlier cases, as it then will encourage ex ante com-
pliance with its preferences by the lower courts. The upshot of this 
                                                                                                                  
ment-petitioner advantage although it may arise from either the government’s petitioning 
or settlement strategy. 
 95. See SALOKAR, supra note 18, at ch. 4. 
 96.  Infra p. 422. 
 97. Omitted from this table are cases where the Solicitor General entered an amicus 
brief either for the petitioner or the respondent. This choice was made to provide a “gov-
ernment-free” control group. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 431 & n.1, for more 
details on the case selection choices. 
 98. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal -Agent 
Model on Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 690-94 (1994). 
The result is also consistent with traditional “cue theory,” in which error correction is a 
factor in grants of certiorari. See Donald R. Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for 
Supreme Court Decisions on Certiorari, 41 J. POL. 1185, 1185-94 (1979). 
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strategy is to preferentially grant certiorari to cases that are likely to 
be reversed. 
 Some direct evidence of this principal-agent strategy is provided 
by Boucher and Segal, who show that justices who vote to grant cer-
tiorari are statistically more inclined subsequently to vote to reverse 
the lower court than are the justices who voted against certiorari. 99 
Certainly the aggregate pattern of case outcomes suggests such a fac-
tor. Note that in Table 1, reversals are more common than affir-
mances among cases with no government participation. For cases in-
volving the government, both government and the private party are 
more successful as the petitioner than as the respondent, although 
among cases where the private party petitions for certiorari, affir-
mances are more common than reversals. 
 Figure 1100 shows the difference between the different reasons for 
affirmance and reversal rates. In Figure 1, x is the “management” ef-
fect: the base rate at which the Supreme Court reverses the circuit 
court in order to carry out its managerial functions. We would expect 
this rate to vary with the extent of policy consonance between the 
Supreme Court Justices and the judges on the appellate court under 
review. Accordingly, this rate should vary depending on the year and 
the circuit court from which a particular case originates.  
 In the results reported here, we separated x into two parts and es-
timated each in our regression equation. First, we used a constant 
term. This constant picks up the overall tendency in the system to 
reverse the circuit courts, regardless of the year in which the case 
was decided or the circuit court from which the case came. Second, 
we calculated the average rate at which the Supreme Court reversed 
cases that did not involve the government as either the petitioner or 
the respondent from the circuit court under review during the previ-
ous three years. We chose this strategy, first, to measure an effect 
independent of government participation and, second, to avoid possi-
ble correlation to the cases under review in the current year. Three 
previous years were chosen in order to have a sufficiently large sam-
ple of cases. Of course, this introduces some error into the measure 
as the personnel of the courts change each year, albeit slowly. Be-
cause of the dearth of cases without government participation in the 
D.C. Circuit, we included a dummy variable for that district, and we 
defined the reversal rate for cases originating from that court as the 
national average for the preceding three years.101 
                                                                                                                  
 99. See Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic 
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 
824, 833 (1995). 
 100. Infra p. 425. 
 101. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27. We also report a “fixed effects” conditional 
regression that, in effect, controls for each circuit and each year. The results of interest are 
equivalent to those discussed here. This alternate specification has the advantage of a 
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 We need to control for a second possibility—that the Supreme 
Court may be, in general, more progovernment than are the circuit 
courts. 102 Recall the claims, reviewed in the previous Part of this Ar-
ticle, that the Solicitor General is held in high regard by the Justices, 
a position which he enjoys by unusual competence, by litigating the 
most before the Supreme Court, and by being the possible beneficiary 
of the Supreme Court’s predilection to defer to the executive.103 This 
hypothesis will be called the Solicitor General “deference effect” to 
distinguish it from a strategic case selection advantage.104 All of the 
government cases in our sample were litigated by the Office of the 
Solicitor General.105 Both of the explanations for government’s liti-
gant advantage lead one to expect that the Supreme Court on its own 
volition will grant certiorari more often to cases where the govern-
ment is likely to prevail. Thus, the Court’s decisions will be progov-
ernment, but its reviewing choices would not be constrained by the 
government. The deference effect does not, on its own, suggest that 
                                                                                                                  
more intuitive fixed effect and also more data (the procedure reported here “wastes” three 
years to construct the reversal rate coefficient) but is limited in ease of interpretation and 
particularly in the ability to calculate predicted values. 
 102. The Supreme Court also reviews some decisions of state supreme courts and di-
rectly reviews some federal district court decisions. The logic that argues a progovernment 
advantage of the U.S. Supreme Court relative to circuit courts applies more strongly to 
these cases. We restrict our statistical analysis to cases appealed from circuit courts. Con-
sequently, it is the relationship between the courts and the Supreme Court that is the fo-
cus of the discussion in this Part. 
 103. There is an enormous literature on this point. For a sample, see Symposium, The 
Role and Function of the United States Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1047 (1988). 
 104. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) may indeed be responsible for some or 
all of the selection activities tested for in this study. The OSG reviews requests by most 
government agencies who want to appeal cases to circuit courts and decides whether to pe-
tition for certiorari for cases decided adversely by the circuits. Functionally, cases go 
through both an agency filter, which requests the OSG to appeal to a circuit or to petition 
for certiorari, and the OSG filter. The OSG turns down most requests to ask for certiorari. 
The logic that suggests selectivity by agencies (considering the externalities of affirmances) 
applies perhaps more strongly to the OSG, which would consider interdepartmental exte r-
nalities as well as intradepartmental ones. We have no empirical way of distinguishing be-
tween advantages that arise from agency incentives and those that arise from the OSG in 
this study. Thus, we lump the two together under the rubric of government advantages. 
However, the subsequent Part returns to the question of reputation and motivation in the 
selection criteria. 
 105. During the years covered by our sample, the Supreme Court did not grant certio-
rari to any cases brought directly by federal departments or agencies. Thus, this sample 
includes all Supreme Court cases with a federal petitioner. During this period, as far as we 
can tell, the Solicitor General always defended the federal government before the Supreme 
Court. Consequently, we believe that we have a comprehensive set of cases involving the 
federal government as either the petitioner or the respondent before the Supreme Court. 
The formal ability of agencies to bring suits to the Supreme Court appears more diverse 
than their practices. The right of agencies to appeal to circuit courts, as opposed to going 
through the Solicitor General’s Office first for approval, varies in practice, but this compli-
cation is ignored in the current paper. For a game-theoretic analysis of the relationship be-
tween the Supreme Court and the Solicitor General, see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. 
Spitzer, Including the Solicitor General, Part II (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors). 
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the government would do even better as the petitioner than as the 
respondent. 
 Figure 1 identifies the deference effect as y. When the government 
is the petitioner, it enjoys a success rate of x+y.106 When the govern-
ment is the respondent, it can expect to lose cases at a rate of x-y, 
which is less often than private party respondents (who lose at rate 
x). Figure 1 also shows that we assume that the Solicitor General in-
stitutional advantage is symmetric around x. We expect the defer-
ence effect, y, to vary by year. For example, changes in the relative 
policy positions of the Supreme Court, the President, and the agen-
cies (which may involve Congress as well) may produce changes in y. 
It may also vary depending on the issue area. For example, the Court 
may be more inclined to defer on issues involving national security, 
foreign affairs, or highly scientific debates than those addressing in-
dividual rights. 107 
 To detect the institutional advantage, we coded the cases “1” when 
the government is the petitioner, “0” if there is no government in-
volvement, and “-1” if the government is the respondent. Ceteris 
paribus, we would expect the coefficient for this variable to be posi-
tive—reversals are more common when the government is the peti-
tioner and less common when it is the respondent. In the regression 
reported here, two complications are included: First, the variable 
may vary by year to capture the changes discussed above. Second, we 
coded cases to distinguish between two types of government cases. 
Type I cases are those where the government petitioned to the circuit 
court. All Type I cases passed through the Solicitor General filter 
prior to the circuit court decision and prior to the petition for certio-
rari. Thus, in Type I cases, there may be selection effects present 
whether the government is the respondent or the petitioner. Type II 
cases, in contrast, are those where the government did not appeal to 
the circuit court. In Type II cases, either the government won at the 
district court, and so was the appellant at the circuit level, or the 
case came on direct appeal from an administrative agency. Hence, in 
Type II cases, the first opportunity for selection occurs at the certio-
rari petition level.  
 Finally, to detect a strategic component, we include a variable 
that indicates whether the government has had the opportunity to 
select the case under review. Figure 1 below shows this as z: if the 
                                                                                                                  
 106. This figure is intended only to illustrate the idea behind our estimation. In fact, 
our statistical approach utilizes a logit estimation that is nonlinear to take account of the 
constraint that a probability must lie between zero and one. The estimation assumes that 
the government bias is not linearly (or additively) symmetric, but rather in effect propo r-
tionately symmetric, taking account of the upper and lower bounds on a likelihood of re-
versal.  
 107. Variation by issue area is examined in Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 455. 
There are systematic differences in deference as outlined here. 
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government is the petitioner, then its success rate would be x+y+z, in 
part due to the general success of petitioners granted certiorari (x), in 
part due to its favored role as government litigant (y), and in part 
due to strategic selection (z). If selection has no constraining effect on 
the Supreme Court, we would estimate z to be zero. We only expect to 
find a z effect in those cases where the first opportunity for strategic 
selection is at the certiorari level, that is, in the Type II cases. Such 
bias would be expected in all Type I cases or possibly be much 
weaker if the selection is even narrower at the Supreme Court level 
than the circuit court level. 108 Table 2 below109 reports success rates 
by case type. Note that these numbers roughly correspond to the dis-
cussion in this Part, although this table cannot control for variation 
in the management effect across circuits or terms. 
B.   Results of the Econometric Study 
 Table 3110 contains the results of the logit estimation. We find 
that, controlling for both a progovernment tendency and an underly-
ing propensity to reverse lower courts, the government still is ab-
normally successful before the Supreme Court when the government 
petitions for review. To restate this conclusion, the government suc-
ceeds more often as the petitioner before the Supreme Court than we 
would predict on the basis of two regularities: petitioners tend to be 
successful once their petitions are granted certiorari and the Su-
preme Court favors the government’s position more than do the cir-
cuit courts. The latter two effects can be interpreted as choices made 
by the Supreme Court: its strategy in setting its certiorari agenda. 
Additional success for the government in Type II cases runs counter 
to the standard hypotheses about how the Supreme Court chooses its 
agenda when unconstrained. It is consistent with our hypothesis that 
the government is far more selective in its petitioning strategies than 
are its adversaries before the federal courts.  
 We estimate the effect only for those cases where the govern-
ment’s first opportunity to select out of appeal is at the Supreme 
Court. While the same effect may hold for other cases, we cannot di-
rectly separate the institutional and strategic impacts for cases 
where the government had the opportunity to select out of litigation 
at the appellate level. Our sample consists of all cases heard by the 
Supreme Court that came on appeal from a circuit court of appeals 
from the 1987 and 1997 terms. To keep the possible reputational ef-
fect of the Solicitor General “clean,” we omitted from the sample any 
                                                                                                                  
 108. Why the strategic selection effect would vary by either year or administration is 
not clear. Without a compelling reason to so distinguish and with already low degrees of 
freedom, we constrained this coefficient to be constant across sample years. 
 109. Infra p. 423. 
 110. Infra p. 424. 
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cases where the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief on whether to 
grant certiorari or on the substantive issues. 
 The regression reported in Table 3 includes six explanatory vari-
ables.111 The coefficient for the reversal rate variable is positive and 
highly significant, and it supports the strategic management hy-
potheses about the Supreme Court: the outcomes are highly corre-
lated for cases granted certiorari from a single circuit court within a 
small number of years.112 Finally we include a dummy variable for 
labor cases, as during this period the Court was systematically more 
likely to affirm cases that involved the labor agencies (the Depart-
ment of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board) than for 
other cases. 
 Coefficients for the government selection and deference effects are 
both positive and significant, consistent with our main hypotheses. 
How important is the selection effect? Interpreting logit coefficients 
is not straightforward. Because the logistic curve is nonlinear, the ef-
fect of a single variable depends on the values that other variables 
assume for each observation. A useful way to evaluate the results is 
to consider the difference in the likelihood of reversal for the cases 
that we hypothesize are subject to the selection bias: those where the 
government petitioned for review at the Supreme Court but not at 
any lower court. There are ninety such cases in the subexample used 
in the estimation, of which 79% were reversed (that is, the govern-
ment position prevailed) and 21% were affirmed. We calculated for 
each of these cases the predicted likelihood of reversal if the govern-
ment had petitioned these cases for review, but the additional selec-
tion effect did not hold—that is, allowing for the relative esteem that 
the Supreme Court held for the appellate court under review and for 
a progovernment bias in the case due to the preferences of the Su-
preme Court rather than strategic selection by the executive branch. 
In this case, we estimate that the expected number of reversals 
would be 65% of the total. 
 From these estimates, we can infer how many cases the Solicitor 
General declined to petition for review that, absent selection, we 
would predict that the Supreme Court would have reviewed and af-
firmed. In the actual sample, seventy-one cases were reversed, or 
79% of the ninety cases in this category. For seventy-one cases to be 
65% of the sample, the sample would have to include thirty-eight 
cases where the government lost, or a total of 109 cases rather than 
                                                                                                                  
 111. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 432-33, for further model specifications 
and discussion of the sample and estimation. The alternate specifications explore differ-
ences in selection and deference over time and by issue area. Results for the selection bias 
reported here are robust in these more complicated specifications. 
 112. In Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 27, at 470, we consider a fixed effects (conditional 
logit) model which yields the same qualitative results for the variables of interest here. 
414  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:391 
 
ninety. Thus, the estimates here predict that the Solicitor selected 
out nineteen cases. 
 As is discussed above, our coefficient for the selection effect is 
likely to be biased down for two reasons. First, we are ascribing any 
selection bias that might take place prior to circuit court appeals to a 
deference effect rather than a selection effect. Second, an asymmetric 
settlement strategy by the government will weaken the measured se-
lection effect. Thus, the extent to which we can estimate the selection 
effect is likely to be understated. Given this bias, our result that in 
the cases where we can measure selection, the government may be 
withholding 20% of the cases that the Supreme Court would like to 
review is a substantial number—certainly sufficient to give credence 
to the concerns discussed in the first Parts of this paper. 
IV.   IMPLICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 The government-petitioner advantage produces several implica-
tions for administrative law. We consider here the implications of the 
analysis for private parties versus the government and for the judici-
ary versus the executive, and we offer some preliminary comments 
about the implication of our analysis for statutory design. 
A.   The Government-Petitioner Advantage and the Coase Theorem 
 Part II assumes that the cost of an affirmance by the Supreme 
Court is zero for a private (local) party and positive for the govern-
ment. The affirmance cost modeled, however, is only the cost to the 
private potential petitioner. More generally, there is a cost associated 
with a Supreme Court affirmance and possibly a benefit with a re-
versal, which includes the costs imposed on and the benefits enjoyed 
by similarly situated parties in other circuits, now subject to the de-
cision of the original reviewing court. By petitioning the Supreme 
Court to review weak cases, the private party imposes a potential ex-
ternality on similarly situated firms or individuals in other cir-
cuits. 113 By settling strong cases, rather than pursuing them to the 
Supreme Court, the private party denies similarly situated firms or 
individuals potential benefits. 
 These external costs will only show up in a subset of the cases. 
Where the first circuit court to address an issue resolves it in favor of 
the government, then there may be no external cost. The government 
                                                                                                                  
 113. The externality here is from a change in law, rather than costs and deterrence, as 
analyzed by Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 
371 (1986), Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the So-
cial Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997), and Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: 
A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483 (1987), who consider 
social costs of private law rather than the issues that arise in public or administrative law. 
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is already pursuing its own policies in all the circuits, and an affir-
mance by the Supreme Court will not change the law that is being 
applied in any of the circuits.114 However, if there have been prior cir-
cuit court cases favorable to private parties in other circuits, an af-
firmance of a case favorable to the government may impose costs on 
other private parties. 115 The affirmance will overturn doctrine favor-
able to private parties in other circuits. The private party who is con-
sidering appealing will not take the external costs into account when 
making its decision. 
 This is a standard problem of the commons. The nonstandard fea-
ture of the problem is the asymmetry in calculations among types of 
litigants. The government petitioner does not suffer from a failure of 
the commons. The federal bureaucracy, through strategic choice of 
appeal, can avoid, for a while, judicial decisions to its disadvantage 
while promptly pursuing those with broader positive impacts for the 
bureaucracy. Other parties have negative decisions imposed rela-
tively promptly but may experience a delay in decisions to their fa-
vor. Thus, in administrative cases, the federal structure of judicial 
review works to the advantage of the federal bureaucracy over regu-
lated parties. 
 “But why,” those of us raised on the Coase Theorem116 might ask, 
“doesn’t the market take care of this”? After all, in the absence of 
transaction costs—perfect information, no bargaining costs, and no 
strategic bargaining—those who stand to gain or lose by a private 
litigant’s decision to appeal will offer the private litigant some money 
to change his mind. If the external costs are large enough to justify a 
payment to the private litigant to induce him to change his behavior, 
then those who stand to gain or lose will pay enough to change the 
decision. That is precisely what our example of the Taxman case, dis-
cussed in Part II.A.1, shows. There may be a transfer of resources, 
but the set of cases brought by private parties to the Supreme Court 
should have just as strong a petitioner advantage as the government 
cases have. 
 This analysis is internally consistent but wrongly applied to this 
setting. Information is far from perfect. To be sure, some industry 
trade associations try to track the external impacts of some cases in 
the federal courts. However, this activity can only track a fraction of 
                                                                                                                  
 114. We thank Dan Gifford for pointing this out to us in comments on a prior draft. 
 115. This presumes that the government is not engaging in intracircuit nonacquies-
ence. 
 116. See Coase, supra note 48, at 1 (1960); see also Philippe Aghion & Benjamin He r-
malin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 381 (1990); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Enti-
tlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Robert Cooter, The Cost of 
Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Richard D. McKelvey & Talbot Page, Taking the Coase 
Theorem Seriously, ECON. & PHIL., Oct. 1999, at 235, 246-47. 
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the potentially important cases. Second, there will be significant bar-
gaining costs in persuading a private litigant to forego an appeal. 
Third, there may be substantial strategic posturing by private par-
ties hoping to “free ride” on the efforts of others to head off poten-
tially damaging petitions. This would include firms hoping that other 
firms in the same industry would pay a potential appellant not to 
bring the appeal. It might also include organizations like the NAACP 
or the NRA, hoping to avoid the negative affects of an affirmance. 
For all of these reasons, we cannot expect bargaining and contracting 
between appellants and third parties adversely affected by the ap-
peals to “correct” the set of cases brought to the Supreme Court. In-
stead, we can expect imperfect information, transaction costs, and 
strategic behavior to produce a government-petitioner advantage at 
the Supreme Court. This is exactly what our statistical analysis con-
firms. 
B.   Private Parties vs. the Government 
 When an attorney for a private party advises a client who is sub-
ject to a form of government regulation, part of the attorney’s advice 
must be based on a prediction of what the courts might do if an ad-
ministrative rule or order is challenged in court. To make that pre-
diction, the attorney usually reads, among other things, the extant 
case law from the Supreme Court. The attorney’s “best reading” of 
the law is to include his or her appraisal of the arguments for and 
against the winning parties in each of the cases, the similarity be-
tween the facts and issues of decided cases and the interests of the 
client, the degree to which the passage of time has changed the 
membership or views of important justices, and so on. We believe 
that all of these things are important.  
 However, our results show that there is something else that is just 
as important as the considerations just mentioned. In particular, the 
attorney should consider sets of cases that never got to the Supreme 
Court because of the government-petitioner advantage. Cases which 
the government might well have lost if appealed to the Supreme 
Court were systematically weeded out before the Supreme Court got 
a chance to make its judgments and issue decisions. Hence, the set of 
decisions that the attorney gets to read will have an overabundance 
of decisions for the government. In the process of making analogies 
between decided cases and his or her own, the attorney will have a 
much easier time making analogies to cases in which the government 
wins than he would have had if there were no government-petitioner 
advantage. As a result, it will be easy for the attorney to overesti-
mate the government’s chances of winning in the Supreme Court. 
 Of course, the attorney can try to adjust for this advantage (after 
reading this Article). He or she can say to himself or herself, “I know 
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that there are some ?missing’ cases from the Supreme Court Reports 
because the government refused to appeal (or settled out) some likely 
losers.”117 However, the attorney has the difficult job of imagining 
what might be in those cases and then trying to give them the proper 
weight. This entire process seems difficult and fraught with error. 
We suspect that such attorneys, like miners who failed to notice that 
canaries had stopped singing, will neglect the import of cases that 
have been weeded out by the government-petitioner advantage. 
C.   Academics 
 As we pointed out in the introduction to this Article, academics 
read administrative law cases for many reasons. All of them are sub-
ject to the government-petitioner advantage. Our historical accounts, 
our doctrinal analysis, our law reform efforts, and our big theories 
are all predicated upon a reading of Supreme Court cases that have a 
progovernment tendency. In some contexts this is more important 
than in others. For example, pure historical work seems least af-
fected. One who is chronicling “what happened” in administrative 
law can, it seems to us, justifiably spend much less time worrying 
about what might have happened if only the government were peti-
tioning nonstrategically.118 On the other hand, if we try to deduce the 
Justices’ or the Court’s ideology and motivations by reading the 
cases, perhaps in historical context, then the government-petitioner 
advantage is more troublesome.119 Strategic petitioning will have 
weeded evidence of the antigovernment ideology out of the record. 
The government-petitioner advantage will lead us to conclude mis-
takenly that the Justices embraced ideologies that were more statist 
than was actually the case. 
                                                                                                                  
 117. In addition, the attorney can read the lower court cases, perhaps note that they 
tend to be slightly less friendly to the government, and then make estimates of winning in 
the courts of appeal. However, without the adjustments in text, the attorney may still mis-
estimate the chances of winning in the Supreme Court. 
 118. Even here, however, one can run into trouble, depending on what one means by 
“what happened.” For example, some new left historians claim that 19th Century appellate 
courts were biased in favor of the railroads and other large capitalist enterprises. See 
HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 48. If the logic of government-petitioner advantage also works 
for large capitalist enterprises that operate in many circuits, and theory says that it 
should, then the observed advantage in the case law might be, in part, a result of strategic 
petitioning, rather than just the preferences of the judges. 
 119. Thus, the most important single article in administrative law, in our opinion, 
Richard Stewart’s The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667 (1975), possibly has some of these problems. Of course, if read as a synthetic histori-
cal account, explaining how the extant cases could be read in each era if one wanted to ra-
tionalize them, then the piece does not suffer from the government-petitioner advantage. It 
is only if the article is read, in part, as trying to deduce what really motivated the Justices, 
that the government-petitioner advantage becomes important. We can make similar obse r-
vations about the enormous volume of scholarship on the Chevron doctrine. 
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 Our law reform efforts may also suffer from the government-
petitioner advantage. First, when deciding whether the existing sys-
tem is “broken,” we read a censored record of Supreme Court opin-
ions. We may be led to conclude mistakenly that there is (is not) a 
problem when there really is not (is) one. Second, when we formulate 
new suggested laws, they will be at variance with what may really be 
“needed.” Third, unless we anticipate that the government will util-
ize our new suggested laws so as to minimize the chance of adverse 
verdicts, our suggestions may miss the mark.120 We academics can 
try to adjust our thinking, just as practicing attorneys and judges 
may try to adjust. We recommend trying to do so. However, we sus-
pect that academics will do no better than our brothers and sisters in 
practice. 
D.   Judges vs. Bureaucrats 
 Our model also has implications for the relative authority of the 
branches of government. This result is easiest to conceptualize in a 
zero-litigation world. Recall that in a zero-litigation cost model, the 
private party always appeals a loss it obtained at a lower court. Only 
the government appeals selectively. In this simplified world, our 
model predicts a ratchet (in the short term) into the Supreme Court’s 
ability to change administrative law. If the Court wants to move in a 
progovernment direction, it will have plenty of cases to adjudicate. 
Cases that are likely to be useful for progovernment rulings will 
move through the courts and up to the Supreme Court at a reason-
able clip. When the government controls the appellate decision (for 
example, it has lost at a lower court), it will appeal cases up through 
the courts. Alternatively, when the private party loses in a lower 
court, it always appeals. Thus, the Supreme Court has its choice for 
cases that will be useful for changing policy in favor of a government 
policy or position. 
 When the Supreme Court wants to move in an antigovernment di-
rection, the situation is more complex. Under the same set of as-
sumptions as above, it will receive cases only from private parties; 
the government itself will not petition such cases for review. Thus, if 
the lower courts have generally ruled in favor of the government, 
then a private party can appeal the relevant cases and the Supreme 
Court will be able to put into effect its policy change. Alternatively, if 
the lower courts have ruled against the government, then the gov-
ernment controls the agenda, and the Supreme Court gets rolled.  
 Whether the Supreme Court receives cases in which it might 
change precedent, then, depends on the actions of the lower courts. If 
                                                                                                                  
 120. For a recent piece integrating law reform, big thinking, and strategic considera-
tions, see Freeman, supra note 9. 
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these courts anticipate a change in precedent by the Supreme Court, 
assuming that the government anticipates the change (and we expect 
no less of the lower federal courts) and if the lower courts want to 
further the interests of the Supreme Court, then their appropriate 
strategy is to rule counter to what they believe the Supreme Court 
will ultimately do; that is, they should set themselves up to be re-
versed. 
 We have never seen any evidence of this type of strategic behav-
ior. Under the more standard scenario, the lower courts will on occa-
sion reverse the government when it expects that action from the 
Supreme Court. The implication is that the Supreme Court will not 
get the cases it may want or need to change policy in an antigovern-
ment direction. 
 Furthermore, the more disposed the courts are against the gov-
ernment, the more tilted the system is in favor of the government. 
The relevant comparison here is between a situation where the 
courts, in unity, are inclined to rule against the federal bureaucracy 
versus the reverse case where the courts, again in unity, are inclined 
to rule against local concerns. With a high likelihood of obtaining re-
view and then failing at the Supreme Court, the bureaucracy is most 
unlikely to appeal relative to the optimal strategy of a local party. Of 
course, if literally every circuit ruled against the government, the 
federal bureaucracy would presumably find it difficult to maintain a 
credible justification for nonacquiescence. However, up to a point, 
such an argument is plausible, and substantial delays in modifying 
policies towards those favored by the courts are possible. 
 The situation described in the preceding paragraph may be a rea-
sonable characterization of the position of the courts and some of the 
federal bureaucracies in the early part of the Reagan Administration. 
Two Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) cases under 
the leadership of Secretary Heckler are held as models of nonacqui-
escence, and they are responsible for the perception that the policy of 
nonacquiescence was created as a crisis in judicial policy.121 After 
Reagan’s election, HHS sharply modified some welfare and disability 
policies, which unleashed a rash of litigation at the district courts. 
HHS lost these cases, they were not appealed, and HHS did not mod-
ify its policies—the classic case of nonacquiescence.122 Only later—
after Reagan had appointed Supreme Court Justices—did such cases 
reach the Supreme Court.123 
                                                                                                                  
 121. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding intracircuit nonacqui-
escence is a per se violation of separation of powers doctrine); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. 
Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (barring intracircuit nonacquiescence). 
 122. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 62, at 699-702. 
 123. See id. at 699 & n.95. 
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E.   Statutory Design 
 This analysis suggests some mechanisms by which the extent of 
the probureaucrat advantage can be modified through statute. If we 
suppose that the enacting coalition of legislators and the President 
had determined the desirable mix of judicial and bureaucratic au-
thority over a regulatory area, what statutory provisions would en-
sue? 
 The legislature could control, in part, the degree of government-
petitioner advantage by controlling the extent to which judicial re-
view is split into more and smaller components. More circuits, more 
levels of review, and more ways to distinguish local results from na-
tional ones would likely exacerbate the commons problem for local 
concerns and the extent to which government and local incentives di-
verge. These would tend to reduce the relative authority of the judi-
ciary and disadvantage the targets of regulation. Alternatively, 
statutory provisions that specify direct appeal to higher courts would 
work in the reverse manner. 
 Statutory provisions that affect the justification for nonacquies-
cence play a similar role. The greater the latitude for nonacquies-
cence, the more costly to the government is a Supreme Court loss 
relative to a circuit court loss. Thus, statutory provisions that allow 
multiple venues work to the advantage, in this respect, of the bu-
reaucracy; those that require appeals to be taken to the D.C. Circuit 
(or the Federal Circuit) empower the judiciary and regulated parties. 
F.   Limits of the Analysis 
 All of the above implications for administrative law presume that 
the increased number of cases in favor of the government worked 
their way into the law of administrative agencies. The most likely 
mechanism is the common law method, based on analogical reason-
ing. The more cases there are that rule in favor of the government, 
the easier it will be to find decided cases with fact situations and 
stated rationales that are similar to any given case that is being liti-
gated. Thus, the government-petitioner advantage should make it 
easier for the government to win in the future. 
 If the Supreme Court can issue decisions with broad rules and ra-
tionales that clearly are more important than other cases, the con-
nection between the government-petitioner advantage and adminis-
trative law is rendered less obvious. If the Supreme Court can issue a 
decision that is against the government and is clearly much more 
important than several progovernment decisions, then “the law” can-
not be determined by counting cases. Instead, one would have to do 
an analysis of content and importance to assess whether the govern-
ment-petitioner advantage had an influence on the law. We take no 
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position on this question in this Article, leaving its resolution for fu-
ture scholarship. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, we developed a model of rational appeals in public 
law which suggests that the government will selectively petition the 
Supreme Court for review—much more so than other petitioners do 
on average. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the se-
lectivity matters: the government petitions so little that the Court is 
constrained in its certiorari choices, and the docket will overall ap-
pear more favorable to the government than the Court would want. 
In brief, the government will not appeal cases where it fears an ad-
verse decision. The Court will have to wait for a different party to 
appeal such cases, which might take a while, particularly if the lower 
courts and the Supreme Court decide cases in a similar way.  
 This asymmetry results from three aspects of the American judi-
cial system. First, only losers can appeal. When the government con-
sistently loses, it can avoid higher levels of review, for only it has the 
power to appeal. Second, the hierarchical structure of American 
courts means that the lower court decisions need not be authorita-
tive, particularly (indeed, uniquely) for a federal litigant. Finally, as 
de Tocqueville observed, the American courts must wait for an ap-
peal. They are structured to be reactive rather than proactive in 
choosing topics to adjudicate. Our analysis shows that this structure 
inherently limits the power of the courts relative to the executive 
branch of government. 
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Table 1: Supreme Court Outcomes by Status of 
the Federal Government 
 
 
 
Supreme Court Outcome Government 
Status 
Affirm Reverse 
Total 
Respondent 128 
59.8% 
86 
40.2% 
214 
100% 
Petitioner 72 
29.3% 
174 
70.7% 
246 
100% 
No Government  
Participation 
146 
42.6% 
197 
57.4% 
343 
100% 
Total 
346 
43.1% 
457 
56.9% 
803 
100% 
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Table 2. Supreme Court Outcomes by Case Type 
 
Supreme Court 
Outcome* Case Type 
Appellate 
Court 
Decision 
Gov’t 
Status at 
Supreme 
Court Affirm Reverse 
Total 
Affirm 
District Ct.; 
against 
govt. 
Petitioner 
38 
  38.4% 
61 
  61.6% 
99 
 100% 
Type I:  
DC ruled 
against gov’t; 
gov’t 
appealed to 
Circuit Ct. 
Reverse 
District Ct.; 
for gov’t 
Respondent 
40 
  64.5% 
22 
  35.5% 
62 
 100% 
Against 
gov’t 
Petitioner 
9 
  27.3% 
24 
  72.7% 
33 
 100% 
Type II:  
Direct 
Appeals to 
Circuit Ct. For gov’t Respondent 
17 
  60.7% 
11 
  39.3% 
28 
 100% 
Reverse 
District Ct.; 
against 
Petitioner 
25 
  21.9% 
89 
  78.1% 
114 
 100% 
Type II:  
DC ruled for 
gov’t; other 
party 
appealed to 
Circuit Ct. 
Affirm 
District Ct.; 
for gov’t 
Respondent 
71 
  57.3% 
53 
  42.7% 
124 
 100% 
Against 
gov’t 
Petitioner 
34 
  23.1% 
113 
  76.9% 
147 
 100% 
All Type II 
Cases 
For gov’t Respondent 
88 
  58% 
64 
 42% 
152 
 100% 
Affirm 
District Ct 
 
87 
  43.1% 
115 
  56.9% 
202 
 100% Type III:  
No gov’t 
participation Reverse 
District Ct 
 
59 
  41.8% 
82 
  58.2% 
141 
 100% 
All Cases   
346 
  43.1% 
457 
  56.9% 
803 
 100% 
 *bold entries indicate decision in favor of the government 
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Table 3: Regression Results (Logit Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Reversal at the Supreme Court 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Government selection   
(“z”: government petitioner; 
Type II case) 
.758** .383 
Court deference to government 
(“y”: institutional advantage of 
government litigant)  
.559** .151 
Reversal rate of cases  
from same circuit  
(“x”: management effect) 
2.322** .450 
Labor cases -1.199* .676 
Appeal from DC or  
Federal Circuit -.730** .337 
Circuit Court affirmed  
District Court .081 .205 
Constant -1.007** .314 
  ** p < .05 
  * p < .10 
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Figure 1: Supreme Court Reversal Rate 
 
 
 
 
